China is preparing to deploy its own Golden Dome. Satellite photographs show a network of air defense missile launch pads designed to protect Beijing’s intercontinental ballistic missile silos from a nuclear first strike. When your enemy begins to ensure that its offensive nuclear capability is protected, it is confirmation that the US’s massive missile defense program has some validity.
Nuclear Ambitions of China Not to Be Overlooked
US concern about China as a near-peer military threat is focused on the Taiwanese Strait and the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) designs on unification with Taiwan. Yet the PRC’s nuclear ambitions cannot be overlooked. The latest threat is the protection being afforded the Red Dragon’s nuclear intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) silos. Establishing a missile defense shield for its ICBM capability is an indication that the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) intends to survive a first strike from an enemy. The PLARF would then launch a countervalue attack on major urban areas, since, after absorbing a first strike, large cities would be the logical target. Attacking silos would seem illogical. However, if China placed its anti-ballistic missile capability surrounding metropolitan and urban areas, that would indicate a willingness to adopt a first-strike strategy. There would be no need to defend empty silos. According to Wikipedia, the PLARF has the primary responsibility for all of China’s land-based missiles, including launch control centers, support facilities, missile brigades, and site security for these assets.
The Center for Global Security Research at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory published a report entitled “Counterforce in Contemporary US Nuclear Strategy.” This analysis provides useful background on US concepts of nuclear counterforce and countervalue strategies. Though it is unlikely that the United States would adopt a first-strike strategy, over the years, American nuclear planners have adopted a stance that relies on uncertainty. As the Center for Global Security Research concludes:
“In the end, contention over targeting concepts was papered over as the U.S. approach incorporated elements of both CF [counterforce] and CV [countervalue]. This remained the case throughout the post-Cold War period, during which there were few calls to revisit the basic approach to targeting. China’s nuclear breakout has changed that, as the implications of continued emphasis on CF targeting become clearer.”
There should be a sense of urgency to understand what China is doing by building missile defense launching pads surrounding its ICBM silo fields, such as those in China’s remote far northwestern Xinjiang region and Gansu province. In a recent report, Reuters explained, “Now, satellite images reviewed by Reuters show Beijing is building a sprawling web of launch pads, bunkers and communications nodes near the isolated nuclear silos that hold the Chinese military’s longest-range missiles. China has built more than 80 launch pads and three octagon-shaped installations in its remote northwest, near the Hami nuclear silo field.”
Satellite Imagery Shows More Than Missile Defense Launch Pads
The imagery also shows that in addition to the missile defense launching pads, “facilities that may serve electronic warfare, satellite communications and command operations, according to three security analysts, who assessed the imagery for Reuters.” Additional pads can be expected as China’s ICBM capability grows. A recent War Department assessment of China’s nuclear capability revealed, “While this report assessed in 2020 that China’s nuclear warheads would double from a stockpile of the low 200s over the next decade, the PLA remains on track to have over 1,000 warheads by 2030.”
The War Department observed, “Beijing continues to reiterate NFU [no first use] when questioned about its lack of transparency regarding its expanding nuclear arsenal and is likely to reemphasize this policy when faced with assessments that it has expanded its objectives for nuclear deterrence.” The PRC’s program for protecting its ICBM silos appears to reinforce the “no-first-strike” policy. However, the construction of missile defense launch pads to defend ICBM silos does not preclude a first-strike nuclear strategy.
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